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ULTRA VIRES LAND USE REGULATIONS:
A SPECIAL CASE IN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Daniel A. Himebaugh∗

ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court’s land use jurisprudence establishes that
arbitrary land use regulations violate the doctrine of substantive due
process. Ultra vires land use regulations—those regulations that exceed
the delegated authority of the regulating agency under state law—
represent a particular type of arbitrary land use regulation. Lower
federal courts that have examined such regulations are split on the
question whether they violate substantive due process. This article
contrasts two federal court of appeals cases in which property owners
alleged that a local government agency deprived them of property
without due process of law by enforcing an ultra vires land use
regulation against them. The article concludes that, consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, ultra vires land use regulations must violate
the substantive due process rights of the individuals whom they affect.
I. INTRODUCTION
It should be obvious that a government agency deprives a landowner
of property without due process of law when the agency imposes a land
use regulation that exceeds the limits of the agency’s delegated authority
under state law. Nevertheless, recent litigation has exposed a split
among federal courts as to whether such ultra vires regulations do indeed
violate the doctrine of substantive due process. This split should be
* J.D., cum laude, Pepperdine University School of Law, 2009; M.P.P., Pepperdine
University School of Public Policy, 2009; B.A., summa cum laude, Hillsdale College,
2004. This article was produced under Pacific Legal Foundation’s Program for Judicial
Awareness. The author filed briefs on behalf of Pacific Legal Foundation and the
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their helpful comments, research support, and editing.
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resolved in favor of finding a violation. After all, the United States
Supreme Court construes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect individuals against arbitrary action on the part of
state governments. A state or local agency which enacts a land use
regulation that it lacks authority to enact appears to be acting arbitrarily.
Applying such arbitrary policies to curb the ability of individuals to use
their property appears to violate the basic due process principle
prohibiting unjustified deprivations of property. Courts, however, do not
always see things as they appear.
This article is presented in multiple parts. Part II discusses three
historical land use cases through which the Supreme Court established a
theory of substantive due process. Part III examines two recent federal
court of appeals cases involving substantive due process challenges to
ultra vires land use regulations—Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta and
Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island. Part IV compares and contrasts
those recent cases and finds that the Second Circuit’s opinion refusing to
uphold an ultra vires permit decision in Cine SK8 reflects the Supreme
Court’s prevailing view of substantive due process, 1 while the Ninth
Circuit’s decision upholding an ultra vires development moratorium in
Samson is not consistent with Supreme Court precedent. 2 These cases
reveal the disagreement among courts on this issue, but they also
demonstrate that courts should see ultra vires land use regulations for
what they are—deprivations of property without due process of law.
II. LAND USE AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AT THE SUPREME COURT
My first task is to establish a working definition of “substantive due
process.” I will not exhaustively investigate the evolution of that
doctrine here.3 For purposes of this surgical exploration, it will suffice to
adopt the Supreme Court’s description of substantive due process as a
constitutional doctrine which is “intended to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”4 Thus, the
1. Cine Sk8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 790 (2d Cir. 2007).
2. Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island, 683 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2012).
3. For a more exhaustive investigation, see Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of
Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
283 (2012) and Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 899 (2007).
4. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)). The Court recognizes a substantive component to the Due
Process Clause: “[B]y barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them, [substantive due process] serves to prevent
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects individuals from
state actions which are arbitrary—i.e., not sufficiently related to
legitimate governmental purposes, such as safeguarding public health,
safety, morals, or welfare.5 An act that does not meet this standard is
invalid because it is not “law,” but only unlawful coercion masquerading
as law.6
With that basic definition in mind, we can begin to trace the doctrine
of substantive due process through the Supreme Court’s land use

governmental power from being ‘used for purposes of oppression.’” Id. at 331-32
(quoting Den ex dem Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277 (1856));
see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2614 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“And this Court has long recognized that
property regulations can be invalidated under the Due Process Clause.”) (citing Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
591 (1962); Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Tr. Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944); Broad
River Power Co. v. S.C. ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 539 (1930); Wash. ex. rel. Seattle
Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926);
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 409 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing Due Process Clause as
protecting individuals against arbitrary state action); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980) (“‘[T]he guaranty of due process . . . demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the objective sought to be attained.’”) (quoting Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523, 525 (1934)); Daniel R. Mandelker, Entitlement to
Substantive Due Process: Old versus New Property in Land Use Regulation, 3 WASH.
U.J.L. & POL’Y 61, 66 (2000) (“Substantive due process provides the basis for reviewing
claims that a municipality’s land use decision does not serve legitimate governmental
interests because the decision is arbitrary.”).
5. See Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. A concise yet powerful statement of the
purpose of government is found in the Washington Constitution at Article I, Section 1:
“All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual
rights.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1. Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2-3
(U.S. 1776) (declaring that governments are instituted to secure individual rights).
6. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2003)
(citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (finding that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “has been understood to contain a
substantive component . . . ‘barring certain government actions, regardless of the fairness
of the procedures’” afforded, at least since 1887); cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388
(1798) (“An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first
principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative
authority.”).
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In the first Supreme Court case to address
jurisprudence.7
comprehensive zoning—Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.—the
Court confronted the question whether the Village of Euclid’s zoning
ordinance facially deprived property owners of liberty and property
The ordinance limited Ambler’s
without due process of law.8
undeveloped lot to residential use, and thereby reduced the property’s
value because it forbade Ambler or any subsequent owner from using the
property for more lucrative industrial purposes.9 The Court determined
that the appropriate constitutional test was whether the zoning ordinance
was “arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”10 The Court famously
refused to strike down Euclid’s zoning ordinance because the Court
believed that the law represented a legitimate exercise of the village’s
police power to guard against the purported dangers of unregulated
development.11 However, the Court allowed that the ordinance could be
arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional, if applied to particular
properties or conditions where it would not reasonably promote a
legitimate governmental purpose.12 Euclid is widely viewed as the
Court’s seminal case on land use planning.13
Soon after Euclid, the Court decided Nectow v. City of Cambridge, a
case in which the Court encountered the “as-applied” problem it had
hypothesized in Euclid.14 Cambridge’s zoning ordinance limited part of
Nectow’s lot to residential use.15 But Nectow’s property was surrounded
by established industrial uses and was effectively rendered valueless by
Cambridge’s zoning restriction.16 The Court held that the zoning
restriction on Nectow’s property did not promote public health or safety
because it was clear that the property could not reasonably be used for
7. The Court has applied substantive due process analysis to land use regulations for
at least a century, but the Court’s opinions in this area are few and far between. See
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“With
one minor exception, between the Nectow decision in 1928 and the 1974 decision in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, this Court did not review the substance of any zoning
ordinances.”).
8. Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384, 397.
9. Id. at 384.
10. Id. at 395.
11. Id. at 394-95.
12. Id. at 395-97.
13. See, e.g., Robert G. Dreher, Lingle’s Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process
from Takings Doctrine, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 372 (2006).
14. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (1928).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 186-87.
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the residential purposes assigned to it by the city’s zoning plan.17
Therefore, the ordinance represented a “serious and highly injurious”
invasion to Nectow’s property rights lacking any “necessary basis” in the
police power.18 The ordinance was nothing more than an arbitrary
restriction, meaning that it violated the Due Process Clause because it
deprived Nectow of the use of his property without legitimate
justification.19
The next important Supreme Court case involving substantive due
process in a land use context was Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.20 The
question in that case was whether a town ordinance that prohibited
excavation below the water table and required a permit for gravel mining
violated the substantive due process rights of the owner of a longestablished gravel pit.21
The Court found that the ordinance
unquestionably prohibited a beneficial use to which the pit owner’s
property had been devoted previously.22 But the Court also found that
the prohibition against excavation was a valid exercise of the police
power because it was reasonably necessary for public safety.23 Goldblatt
affirmed the Court’s reasoning in Euclid and Nectow, which boils down
to the rule that a land use regulation is not arbitrary if it is sufficiently
related to accomplishing a legitimate public objective.24
These historic opinions serve as the doctrinal touchstone for applying
substantive due process in land use cases.25 In fact, the Supreme Court in
the modern era continues to affirm the proposition that arbitrary land use
regulations fail to satisfy the constitutional requirement of substantive
due process because they unjustifiably deprive individuals of their
property rights: “[A] regulation that fails to serve any legitimate
governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul
of the Due Process Clause.”26
17. Id. at 188.
18. Id. at 188-89.
19. Id.
20. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1966).
21. Id. at 592.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 595-96.
24. A word about regulatory takings—under the Supreme Court’s precedent, even a
regulation which satisfies the substantive due process test may result in a taking for
which compensation must be paid if it too severely burdens the owner’s property rights.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
25. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 n.6 (1977).
26. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.C., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005); see also id. at 548-49
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[It is possible] that a regulation might be so arbitrary or
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irrational as to violate due process.”) (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)); Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Lingle for the
proposition that the Due Process Clause “prohibits irrational government action”); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 n.23 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that a landowner may have a cause of action for damages for a
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation when the government enacts regulation that
does not further interest in public health, safety, morals or welfare); Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (citing Euclid for the
proposition that an individual has the “right to be free of arbitrary and irrational zoning
actions”). The Supreme Court’s test for determining whether a land use regulation
violates a property owner’s substantive due process rights has remained the same since
the Court first began to articulate it. See, e.g., Gant v. City of Oklahoma City, 289 U.S.
98, 101 (1933) (applying an “arbitrary and unreasonable” test to an ordinance that
required payment of bond as condition precedent to permitting oil and gas well drilling);
Wash. ex. rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co., 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928) (“Legislatures may not,
under the guise of the police power impose restrictions that are unnecessary and
unreasonable upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities.”); Gorieb
v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927) (upholding a setback requirement because the Court
was “unable to say that the ordinance under review is ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare’”)
(quoting Vill. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)); Zahn v. Bd. of
Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927) (upholding a zoning designation where it was not
“clearly arbitrary and unreasonable”). The federal appellate courts, however, have
adopted widely variant approaches to substantive due process in land use cases. See Paul
D. Wilson & Noah C. Shaw, The Judge as Cartoon Character Whose Hat Flies Into the
Air: The “Shocks the Conscience” Standard in Recent Substantive Due Process Land
Use Litigation, 42 URB. LAW. 677 (2010); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time to Bury the
Shocks the Conscience Test, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 307, 320 (2010); Erica Chee, Property
Rights: Substantive Due Process and the “Shocks the Conscience” Standard, 31 U. HAW.
L. REV. 577, 584-601 (2009); Nisha Ramachandran, Realizing Judicial Substantive Due
Process in Land Use Claims: The Role of Land Use Statutory Schemes, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q.
381, 392 (2009); J. Peter Byrne, Due Process Land Use Claims After Lingle, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 471, 477-80 (2007); Clifford B. Levine & L. Jason Blake, United Artists:
Reviewing the Conscience Shocking Test Under Section 1983, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REV.
101, 112-17 (2005); Parma Mehrbani, Substantive Due Process Claims in the Land-Use
Context: The Need for a Simple and Intelligent Standard of Review, 35 ENVTL. L. 209,
229-36 (2005). Much of the confusion stems from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lewis
v. County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), a police misconduct case that some courts
have construed as establishing a rule that land use decisions will not violate substantive
due process unless they “shock the conscience.” See United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.
v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003); but see id. at 406-07 (Cowen,
J., dissenting) (“[T]ossing every substantive Due Process egg into the nebulous and
highly subjective ‘shocks the conscience’ basket is unwise. It leaves the door ajar for
intentional and flagrant abuses of authority by those who hold the sacred trust of local
public office to go unchecked. ‘Shocks the conscience’ is a useful standard in high speed
police misconduct cases which tend to stir our emotions and yield immediate reaction.
But it is less appropriate, and does not translate well, to the more mundane world of local
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III. TWO CASES ON ULTRA VIRES LAND USE REGULATIONS
One way in which a land use regulation may be arbitrary is if it is
ultra vires.27 It is axiomatic that government agencies may act only
according to the powers delegated to them by the people.28 So when a
government agency engages in an activity that is not included in the
authority conferred upon it, the government acts ultra vires.29
An ultra vires act cannot advance a legitimate governmental purpose
because the government’s purposes are per se illegitimate when it acts
outside the bounds of its delegated authority.30 Thus, an ultra vires land
use regulation is arbitrary in the sense that it is not relevant to any
legitimate governmental purpose, such as safeguarding the public health
or safety. And this arbitrariness means that an ultra vires land use
regulation violates the due process rights of the individuals whom it
affects, according to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in cases like

land use decisions, where lifeless property interests (as opposed to bodily invasions) are
involved.”); Eagle, supra note 3, at 955-56 (“It is understandable that the Supreme Court
would be reluctant to impose liability for split-second close calls in life or death matters
on police officers and their departments. However, it is not apparent that the same
standard should apply to situations where government officials have substantial periods
of time to consider their actions and the court generally has power to put the plaintiff in
the same position he was in before the complained of government action.”). Lewis,
moreover, applies only to executive actions and does not govern cases where the
challenged act is legislative in nature. Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442
F.3d 159, 169 (3d Cir. 2006); Rector v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 948-49
(10th Cir. 2003).
27. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 30 (2d pocket ed. 2001) (“Unauthorized; beyond the
scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law . . . .”).
28. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 130 (Conn. 2001) (“[I]t
is equally settled that a municipality, as a creation of the state, has no inherent powers of
its own, and has only those powers expressly granted to it by the state or that are
necessary for it to discharge and carry out its purposes.”); Green River Cmty. Coll. v.
High Educ. Pers. Bd., 622 P.2d 826, 829 (Wash. 1980) (“[A]n agency has only those
powers either expressly granted or necessarily implied from statutory grants of
authority.”).
29. See Davis v. Reed, 462 F. Supp. 410, 412 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (“[Ultra vires] acts
are beyond the official’s statutory authority, acts taken pursuant to constitutionally void
powers, or acts exercised in a constitutionally void manner.”) (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372
U.S. 609 (1963)).
30. I emphasize here that the term “ultra vires” describes a situation in which a
government agency takes action not encompassed within its delegated authority. I am not
referring to agency action that affirmatively violates other provisions of law; rather, I am
referring to agency action that is invalid for no other reason than that the agency lacks
authority in the first place.
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Euclid.31 However, ultra vires land use regulations are the source of
some confusion in the courts. Two cases—one from the Second Circuit
and one from the Ninth Circuit—demonstrate that courts differ in their
understanding of ultra vires land use regulations in a substantive due
process analysis.
A. Case 1: Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta
In Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, the owners of a family
recreation business called Fun Quest obtained a special use permit to
host youth dances at their facility.32 Fun Quest’s business quickly grew
to the point that it attracted over six hundred teenage customers every
night.33 One night a very large group of teenagers arrived at Fun Quest.34
They came from a nearby movie theater that had lost power.35 It was a
cold night in Henrietta, New York, so most of the teenagers began
elbowing their way into Fun Quest’s foyer.36 The crowd became so
dense that ingress and egress were cut off and the fire marshal was
summoned to the scene.37 Thousands of people were trying to push their
way into Fun Quest by the time the fire marshal arrived and cleared the
area with the help of police.38
Days later, one of the Henrietta town supervisors sent a letter to the
owners of Fun Quest asking that they immediately discontinue teen
dances.39 The letter threatened to revoke or amend Fun Quest’s special
use permit if the owners did not comply.40 Town officials held a special
meeting the next day at which they reviewed the overcrowding
incident.41 The Town Board then held its regular meeting and passed a
resolution calling for a public hearing to consider the revocation or

31. Supra Part II.
32. Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 779 (2d Cir. 2007).
33. Id. at 780.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 780-81. Despite the crowd, Fun Quest’s owners maintained that the number
of people who were inside the building at any given time that night never exceeded the
limit set by their occupancy certificate. Id. at 781.
39. Id. at 781.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 781-82. The Second Circuit found that there was credible evidence that at
least one board member suggested that the overcrowding problem was related to the
minority race of many of Fun Quest’s customers. Id. at 785-89.
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amendment of Fun Quest’s special use permit.42 After a contentious
hearing, the Board voted unanimously to adopt a resolution amending
Fun Quest’s special use permit to forbid teen dances.43 Fun Quest later
went bankrupt and had to close because the dance ban destroyed its
business.44
The owners sued the town for violating their substantive due process
rights because, they argued, the Board did not have authority to amend a
validly issued special use permit under town regulations.45 The Second
Circuit concluded that the appropriate question to ask in this situation
was whether the town infringed on the owners’ property rights in an
arbitrary or irrational manner.46 The court examined the town regulations
and discovered that the Board could approve, deny, suspend, or revoke a
special use permit, but nowhere did the code provide that the Board had
the authority to amend a duly issued special use permit and place
limitations on it.47 The Second Circuit thus agreed with the property
owners: “[I]f the Town Board did not have authority for the actions it
took regarding Fun Quest’s permit—as it appears it did not—the Board’s
actions were ultra vires and, as a result, sufficiently arbitrary to amount
to a substantive due process violation.”48 The Second Circuit reversed
the lower court’s award of summary judgment to the town, and remanded
the case to allow Fun Quest’s owners to proceed on their substantive due
process claim.49
B. Case 2: Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island
The Ninth Circuit adopted a different approach to ultra vires land use
regulations in Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island.50 The City of
Bainbridge Island encompasses an island located due west of Seattle in
42. Id. at 782-83.
43. Id. at 783.
44. Id. The appellate court reported that the owners had spent millions of dollars
renovating the center to make it suitable for hosting dances. Id. at 785.
45. Id. at 784.
46. Id. (citing Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 503 (2d Cir.
2001)).
47. Id. at 789-90.
48. Id. at 789.
49. Id. at 790-93. A district court in the Second Circuit recently described Cine SK8
as embracing “the proposition that any government action taken outside the scope of the
[government’s] authority, i.e., an ‘ultra vires’ act, is ‘sufficiently arbitrary to amount to a
substantive due process violation.’” TZ Manor, LLC v. Daines, 815 F. Supp. 2d 726, 745
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Cine SK8, 507 F.3d at 789).
50. Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island, 683 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).
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the Puget Sound.51 The city has forty-eight miles of shoreline, which are
subject to various regulations under Washington’s Shoreline
Management Act and the city’s Shoreline Master Program (SMP).52 In
2001, Bainbridge Island adopted an ordinance which imposed a one-year
moratorium on new shoreline development in the city’s Blakely Harbor
area.53 The city stated that the moratorium would allow it to maintain the
environmental status quo while city officials revised the SMP.54 A few
months after adopting the moratorium, the city amended it to include a
ban on new overwater structures and shoreline armoring.55
Shoreline property owners sued the city after the city amended the
moratorium.56 They alleged that the city had exceeded the scope of its
police power under the state constitution.57 Undeterred, the city extended
the moratorium for an additional seven months almost a year after the
property owners filed suit.58
The Kitsap County Superior Court ruled in favor of the property
owners, holding that the city had overstepped its constitutional authority
when it enacted the moratorium.59 The city appealed, obtained a stay,
and extended the moratorium again while the appeal was pending.60 The
city lost the appeal in 2004, and petitioned for review to the Supreme
Court of Washington, which granted review in 2006 in a case called
Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island.61 While litigation dragged on, the
property owners were all-the-while blocked from applying for permits
needed to build and maintain structures that would prevent their
properties from washing into the sea.62
The Washington Supreme Court issued an opinion in 2007 holding
that the moratorium exceeded the city’s delegated authority.63 Shoreline
51. See Biggers v. City of Bainbridge, 169 P.3d 14, 18 (Wash. 2007).
52. Id.; see also Wash. Rev. Code §§ 90.58.010 - 90.58.920q. (2014); Bainbridge
Island Mun. Code 16.12.010-16.12.420 (2013).
53. Samson, 683 F.3d at 1055.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id. (citing Biggers, 169 P.3d at 17-19).
57. Biggers, 169 P.3d at 18-19.
58. Samson, 683 F.3d at 1055-56.
59. Id. at 1056.
60. Id.
61. Biggers, 169 P.3d at 19-20 (citing Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 124
Wash. App. 858 (2004)); see Samson, 683 F.3d at 1056.
62. See Biggers, 169 P.3d at 17.
63. The court held that the moratorium violated Article XI, Section 11 of the
Washington Constitution. Biggers, 169 P.3d at 17, 25; see WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11
(“Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such
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local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.”).
The lead opinion, signed by four justices, held that all local shoreline development
moratoria violated Article XI, Section 11 because such moratoria conflicted with various
provision of state law, including constitutional provisions granting regulatory authority
over shorelines to the state, and the Shoreline Management Act. Biggers, 169 P.3d at 2024. State law was designed to allow property owners to construct water-dependent
facilities through the timely processing of permits, and moratoria are inconsistent with
that goal. Id. Justice Chambers did not join the four, but wrote separately to concur that
the city “overstepped its constitutional limits” by enacting the moratoria. Id. at 25
(Chambers, J., concurring). He found the particular moratoria at issue represented an
unreasonable use of the police power, emphasizing that the “rolling” nature of the
moratoria caused burdensome delay and created uncertainty for shoreline property
owners. Id. at 25-27. He did not mince words: “[I]t is arrogant, high handed, and beyond
the pale of any constitutional authority for a stagnant government to deny its citizens the
enjoyment of their land by refusing to accept building permits year after year based on a
‘rolling’ moratorium.” Id. at 27. But rather than holding that all shoreline moratoria
everywhere were invalid, Justice Chambers held that only Bainbridge Island’s rolling
moratoria violated Article XI, Section 11. Id. at 26. Justice Chambers’ concurring
opinion represents a logical subset of the four-judge plurality which invalidated all
shoreline moratoria, and the narrowest position supporting the judgment to strike down
Bainbridge Island’s moratoria. See Michelle E. DeLappe, The Legality of Washington
Shoreline Development Moratoria in the Wake of Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island,
84 WASH. L. REV. 67, 85 (2009). The rule for interpreting plurality opinions provides
that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
ground.’” United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)); see Washington v. Valdez, 224 P.3d
751, 758 (Wash. 2009); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1011, 1016-18
(Wash. 1999). Courts need not identify a legal position that a majority joined, but merely
“’a legal standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce results with which a
majority of the Court from that case would agree.’” United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d
1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Planned Parenthood. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d
Cir. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). The
opinion of one concurring Justice may therefore constitute the holding of the court, so
long as that opinion is “a logical subset of the plurality’s and . . . adopt[s] a holding that
would affect a narrower range of cases than that of the plurality.” Williams, 435 F.3d at
1157 n.9. Therefore, the court held in Biggers that the city’s rolling moratoria
represented an ultra vires exercise of the police power and were unconstitutional and void
under Article XI, Section 11 of the Washington Constitution. See Biggers, 169 P.3d at
25-27 (Chambers, J., concurring in result); see also Parkland Light & Water Co. v.
Tacoma-Pierce Cnty. Bd. of Health, 90 P.3d 37, 40 (Wash. 2004) (“A local regulation
that conflicts with state law fails in its entirety.”). The state court victory in Biggers was
short-lived. Two years after the Washington Supreme Court’s decision, the Washington
Court of Appeals upheld the city’s permanent ban on new docks in Blakely Harbor, and
the Washington Supreme Court denied review of that decision. Samson v. City of
Bainbridge Island, 149 Wash. App. 33 (2009), review den., Samson v. City of Bainbridge
Island, 218 P.3d 921 (Wash. 2009).
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owners then pressed on with separate litigation in federal court seeking
damages for the long period of time during which they had been barred
from applying for permits that would have allowed them to improve and
protect their properties.64
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington issued an opinion in 2010 acknowledging that the Supreme
Court of Washington had declared the city’s moratorium to be “invalid,”
but the district court concluded that the property owners were not entitled
to damages.65 The owners appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which
characterized the case as requiring the owners to show “that Bainbridge’s
ordinances establishing and extending the moratorium were ‘clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare.’”66
The shoreline owners argued that the city’s conduct infringed on
their property rights in violation of due process due to the Washington
Supreme Court holding that the moratorium was ultra vires in Biggers.67
The Ninth Circuit rejected that claim and concluded that the city had
acted wisely—not arbitrarily—because the moratorium protected the
shoreline from a “wave” of “ad hoc” development.68 After years of
living under a moratorium that prevented them from taking care of their
properties, and then winning a state court victory which declared the
moratorium to reside beyond the city’s delegated powers, the Samson
plaintiffs came away empty-handed.69
IV. CINE SK8, SAMSON, AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Though they addressed different circumstances, the Cine SK8 and
Samson cases are remarkably similar. Each case presented the same
essential question: when a local government acts in a manner that
exceeds its delegated authority under state law and infringes on
individuals’ property rights, must a court conclude that the government
64. Samson, 683 F.3d at 1053.
65. Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island, 683 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1173, 1178 (W.D.
Wash. 2010).
66. Samson, 683 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d
1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1994)).
67. Samson, 683 F.3d at 1058.
68. Id. at 1060.
69. The shoreline owners won no damages. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari, Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island, 133 S. Ct. 652 (2012), and the
development moratorium had taken the form of a permanent ban by the time the Ninth
Circuit issued its opinion in 2012, Samson, 683 F.3d at 1061.
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has deprived the affected individuals of property without due process of
law? In Cine SK8, the town board passed an ultra vires resolution that
amended Fun Quest’s special use permit and caused the property owners
to go bankrupt.70 In Samson, the city council enacted an ultra vires
development moratorium that cost shoreline property owners the
reasonable use of their property for an extended period of time.71 The
local governments’ actions in both cases were outside the bounds of their
respective authority; however, each reviewing court adopted a different
understanding of the consequences that flowed from that fact.
The Cine SK8 court recognized that a government agency does not
act reasonably when it ventures beyond the limits of its delegated
authority. This is not a monumental conclusion because the law is clear
that ultra vires acts are void.72 On the other hand, the Cine SK8 court can
be seen as swimming against the current because it equated an action that
was ultra vires under state law with a due process violation under the
United States Constitution.73 The Cine SK8 court could have chosen to
view the town’s decision to amend Fun Quest’s permit merely as a
commonsense way to prevent another overcrowding incident. If viewed
in that light, the town’s actions would have fallen in line with the basic
rule that allows local governments to infringe upon private property
rights when necessary to safeguard the public.74 But the Cine SK8 court
did not take that path, because upholding the town’s decision to amend
the permit would have required the court to uphold an act that the town
supervisors were never authorized to perform.75 Thus, the court

70. Supra Part III.
71. Id.
72. 56 Am. Jur. 2d Mun. Corp. §179 (2013) (“Acts beyond the scope of the powers
conferred on a municipality are ‘ultra vires’ and are void.”).
73. It is no secret that a property owner will have difficulty prevailing in federal court
if he alleges that a land use regulation violates his substantive due process rights. In fact,
some commentators have described substantive due process claims in land use cases as
the “most unlikely to succeed” because they are commonly analyzed under low-level
scrutiny by courts that want to avoid becoming entangled in “local” disputes. Joseph D.
Richards & Alyssa A. Rugs, Most Unlikely to Succeed: Substantive Due Process Claims
Against Local Governments Applying Land Use Restrictions, 78 FLA. BAR J. 34 (2004);
see Byrne, supra note 26, at 475 (“In the lower federal courts, judges lately have been
adamant in the repugnance they feel toward entertaining due process land use claims.”).
But see Mandelker, supra note 4, at 94 (opining that judicial review should be available
for arbitrary land use decisions).
74. See supra Part II.
75. Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 789 (2d Cir. 2007).
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concluded that the town’s ultra vires decision was sufficiently arbitrary
to violate the property owners’ due process rights.76
The Cine SK8 court’s conclusion is consistent with the Supreme
Court precedent discussed in Part II.77 The applicable rule, going back to
Euclid, is that a land use regulation which fails to advance or promote the
public health, safety, morals, or welfare is arbitrary and invalid.78 The
town board’s decision to amend Fun Quest’s permit did not promote
public health or safety because the residents of Henrietta never granted
the board authority to amend a special use permit in pursuit of those
purposes.79
In contrast to Cine SK8, the Samson court did not hold that the City
of Bainbridge Island’s ultra vires development moratorium deprived
shoreline owners of property without due process of law.80 It would have
been logical for the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Samson to mirror Cine
SK8, but there are two possible reasons why the Samson court went in a
different direction. First, the Samson court endorsed the environmental
ethic of the city’s moratorium and found that it weighed in favor of
upholding the moratorium. Second, the court failed to see the
importance of the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in Biggers,
which had invalidated the moratorium because it constituted an ultra
vires act.81
In support of its opinion, the Ninth Circuit leaned on Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, a case in
which the Supreme Court described development moratoria as “essential
tool[s] of successful development.”82 The Samson court believed that
Tahoe-Sierra bolstered its conclusion that Bainbridge Island’s
moratorium was “positively sensible” because the moratorium
supposedly prevented a “stampede” of property owners from applying
for permits to improve their properties before the new SMP went into
effect.83 In the Samson court’s eyes, the moratorium was consistent with
the city’s “legitimate interests in protecting wildlife and preserving the
development status quo.”84
76. Id.
77. See supra Part II.
78. See id.
79. Cine SK8, 507 F.3d at 789.
80. Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island, 683 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2012).
81. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge, 169 P.3d 14, 17, 25 (Wash. 2007).
82. Samson, 683 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 338 (2002)).
83. Id. at 1058 n.8.
84. Id. at 1058.
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However, the court’s comfort with the general idea of a development
moratorium led it to misapply the Tahoe-Sierra case. In Tahoe-Sierra,
the Supreme Court issued a narrow opinion under the regulatory takings
doctrine—not substantive due process—concluding that development
moratoria at Lake Tahoe should be evaluated under the framework
established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.85
Tahoe-Sierra did not hold that all development moratoria are sensible
policies, or that such policies are immune from constitutional challenge.86
In fact, Tahoe-Sierra acknowledged that long-term moratoria may
violate property owners’ constitutional rights.87 The Samson court did
not address those concerns, leading it to assert broadly that a
development moratorium is a smart policy choice for planners.88
More to the point, the Samson court’s focus on questions of policy
caused it to overlook an enormous problem: the city did not possess legal
authority to enact the shoreline moratorium in the first place, according
to the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Biggers.89 Yet the Ninth
Circuit chose not to grapple with Biggers.90 This, it seems, is the crucial
difference between Cine SK8 and Samson. The Cine SK8 court’s opinion
rested on the finding that the board’s decision to amend the special use
permit was ultra vires.91 If the Samson court had undertaken the same
threshold analysis to determine whether Bainbridge Island’s moratorium
was ultra vires, the court should have concluded that the moratorium was
arbitrary and violated the shoreline owners’ substantive due process
rights. However, by ignoring that important first step, the Samson court
determined that the city had not acted arbitrarily, even though the highest
court to consider the legality of the moratorium under state law
concluded that the city had acted ultra vires when it enforced the
moratorium against the shoreline property owners.92
85. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 342.
86. See id. at 341-42.
87. Id.
88. See Samson, 683 F.3d at 1059.
89. Id. at 1056, 1058, 1060; see also Biggers v. City of Bainbridge, 169 P.3d 14, 23
(Wash. 2007) (holding that “[t]he City’s imposition of moratoria was ultra vires and in
conflict with the SMA’s regulatory framework”). Even the “best” public policies must be
enacted in conformity with constitutional authority. Cf. New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It
divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we
may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to
the crisis of the day.”).
90. Samson, 683 F.3d at 1060.
91. See supra Part III.
92. Samson, 683 F.3d at 1059.
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The opinion in Samson, unlike that in Cine SK8, is not consistent
with the Supreme Court’s rulings on substantive due process claims in
land use cases. A land use regulation generally complies with the Due
Process Clause if it is sufficiently related to promoting the public health,
safety, morals, or welfare.93 But a local government that institutes an
ultra vires moratorium on development is not advancing any legitimate
governmental purpose because it is acting outside the scope of its
delegated authority. Property owners who cannot reasonably use and
enjoy their property as a result of such a policy have been deprived of
constitutionally protected property rights without due process of law.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”94 The
Supreme Court has interpreted that constitutional provision in land use
cases as requiring the government to act in a non-arbitrary manner, in
pursuit of legitimate governmental objectives.95 The government cannot
pursue legitimate governmental objectives through ultra vires land use
regulations.96 The split among federal courts on this issue demands
Supreme Court review in the next case where the question is presented.
In the meantime, lower courts should embrace the idea that ultra vires
land use regulations are a form of arbitrary government action, and that
such regulations deprive affected individuals of property without regard
for due process.

93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra Part II.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.

